Duncan Grieve and Kyle Eggins-Allman examine Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court, in TRRI.

The High Court has reaffirmed the primacy of the established legal principle of open justice with respect to the anonymisation of individuals in judgments.

In a recent judicial review decision involving the approval of Deferred Prosecution Agreements ("DPAs"), it was confirmed that an individual allegedly involved in corporate wrongdoing may be named in a judgment and permanent anonymisation will only be ordered in exceptional circumstances.

This article provides analysis of the judgment, explains broader case context, and situates the ruling alongside recent DPAs and prosecution of individuals by the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO").

Background – the parties, the DPA and the claimant's criminal proceedings

The High Court decision of Lewis LJ and Bennathan J in Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin) ("Simms") concerns the judicial review of a Crown Court decision of May J to publish a de-anonymised version of a judgment approving two DPAs, which named two directors (including the Claimant) of the companies the subject of the DPAs.

The two DPAs were entered into by the SFO with Bluu Solutions Ltd ("Bluu") and Tetris Projects Ltd ("Tetris") respectively on 19 July 2021, relating to allegations of bribery and failure to prevent bribery. Bluu and Tetris operated in the commercial office fit-out sector, with the Claimant being a former director and majority shareholder of Bluu. The SFO alleged, and Bluu and Tetris agreed in a "Statement of Facts", that the Claimant was involved in making improper payments on behalf of Bluu and Tetris to win several high-value contracts between 2014 and 2016.

By the terms of the DPAs, Bluu agreed to pay the SFO a total of £1,994,071 which was comprised of a financial penalty of £1,527,641 and a payment of £466,430 as a disgorgement of improper profits. Tetris agreed to pay the SFO a total of £515,994, comprised of a financial penalty of £377,997 and a disgorgement of profits of £137,997.

Pursuant to the DPA regime contained in Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 ("CCA"), a DPA is required to be approved by the Crown Court at a hearing (which may be public). If the court approves the DPA, the court must give a declaration that the DPA is in the interests of justice and the terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate.

At an open hearing in July 2021, May J received the Claimant's name, the Statement of Facts and the agreed DPAs.  May J ultimately approved the DPAs in line with the requirements of Schedule 17 of the CCA.

In order to avoid prejudicing the ongoing criminal proceedings against the Claimant, May J anonymised the judgment by referring to the Claimant as "Director 1", Bluu as "AB Ltd" and Tetris as "CD Ltd."  May J also postponed publication of the DPA and the Statement of Facts pursuant to s 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and paragraph 12 of Schedule 17 of the CCA.

In her decision, May J explicitly noted that she made no findings of fact regarding the Claimant, and reemphasised that the court's role in the DPA process is not one of fact finding, rather it is "one of oversight only, making an independent assessment of the public interest in arriving at the DPA and of the reasonableness, fairness and proportionality of the particular terms which the parties have agreed." [1]

The Claimant was subsequently acquitted of all charges by a jury in January 2023.  In July 2023, following Bluu's full compliance with the terms of its DPA, the SFO filed a Notice of Discontinuance which concluded the corporate criminal proceedings.

In March 2024, after a hearing in November 2023 where the Claimant argued for his permanent anonymisation, May J finalised a de-anonymised version of the judgment, replacing references to Director 1 with the Claimant's name.  Following publication of the judgment, the Claimant commenced judicial review proceedings in the High Court to challenge May J's decision to publish the de-anonymised version of the judgment on the basis that May J was wrong in finding that Claimant had to establish that it was necessary to derogate from the principle for open justice in order to protect his right to privacy.

Decision

Lewis LJ, sitting with Bennathan J held that approval of a DPA is part of the administration of justice, and therefore the principle of open justice applies in full.  Lewis LJ and Bennathan J considered that open justice includes naming individuals involved in or described as part of the court's reasoning and that any derogation of open justice to protect an individual's right to private life [2] required clear and cogent evidence of significant harm that would be suffered in de-anonymisation.

Key to the Court's reasoning was that naming an individual in a DPA judgment is not a finding of guilt, and on that basis, the impacts on an individual's article 8 rights through publication are minimal.  While true as a legal distinction, it is arguable that an individual being named in a DPA judgment in the context of corporate offences nonetheless leaves open an inference of wrongdoing from the public, even it does not equate to legal findings of fact or guilt of any offence.

In upholding May J's decision to de-anonymise the judgment, the Court also noted that the Claimant had already been named in open criminal proceedings, and his identity was publicly inferable from the SFO's own website, because the Claimant was also a director and majority shareholder of Bluu.  In the Court's opinion, maintaining anonymity in the circumstances was confusing and served no meaningful protective purpose for the Claimant.

Broader Considerations

Simms reinforces that open justice is the paramount consideration with respect to the anonymisation of judgments.  This is in line with other recent decisions considering the tension between open justice and the right to privacy. [3]

Although there are arguably less intrusive means of promoting open justice, the Simms decision shows that the inquiry is not how open justice and individual privacy can be balanced, but rather whether the limitation of a claimant's rights is so serious that it warrants any derogation from the constitutional principle of open justice.  The Supreme Court decision of Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd and others [4] provided some examples of where derogation of open justice through the making of anonymity orders was justifiable, being where an individual's physical safety was endangered, where there were national security concerns or to protect vulnerable individuals.

That the Claimant was ultimately acquitted by a jury highlights the challenges faced by the SFO in converting corporate admissions of wrongdoing into successful prosecutions of individuals.  Part of this difficulty can be explained by the differing standards of proof required.  The SFO needs only a "reasonable suspicion" that an offence has been committed before negotiating a DPA and agreeing a statement of facts with an entity. [5]  This is obviously far lower than the evidentiary threshold required to secure a criminal conviction: beyond reasonable doubt.  The SFO's difficulty is also explained by the disconnect between facts agreed between the SFO and a corporation, and factual concessions that an individual would be willing to make during criminal proceedings.

These challenges have formed a familiar pattern for the SFO, such as the DPA worth £189 million agreed with Tesco Stores Limited in 2017, which nonetheless concluded with the dismissal of the SFO's case against two former directors by Royce J who determined that "the prosecution case was so weak it should not be left for a jury's consideration."  This decision was upheld on appeal. [6]  More recently, despite G4S Care & Justice Services (UK) Ltd agreeing a £44.5 million DPA in 2020, the SFO discontinued its proceedings against three former executives in March 2023 after its case faced significant evidentiary issues.

[1] Simms-Davies v Southwark Crown Court [2026] EWHC 337 (Admin), [20].

[2] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), article 8.

[3] See R (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2023] 2 Cr App R 215; R (on the application of Rai) v Winchester Crown Court [2021] EWCA Civ 604.

[2021] EWCA Civ 604.

[4] [2019] AC 161.

[5] Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice, cl 1.2(i)(a)-(b).

[6] R v Bush and Scouler [2019] EWCA (Crim) 29.