The CJEU handed down an important decision on this matter (CJEU, 22 June 2022, C-267/20, Volvo AB/DAF Trucjs NV), in which it set out the analysis to be carried out by national judges in order to determine the temporal applicability of the provisions of Directive 2014/104. The CJEU’s decision provided that “it is necessary to establish, in the first place, whether or not the provision concerned constitutes a substantive provision”. As a second step in the analysis, the CJEU ruled that “Once it has been determined whether the provision concerned is substantive or not, it is necessary to ascertain, in the second place, whether, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in which that directive was transposed late, the situation at issue, in so far as it cannot be described as new, arose before the expiry of the time limit for the transposition of that directive or whether it continued to produce effects after the expiry of that time limit.” The Court added that “The fact remains that, where a national court has to determine a dispute between individuals, it is for that court, where appropriate, to interpret the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings, so far as possible, in the light of EU law and [...] without, however, interpreting those national provisions contra legem”.
The Cour de Cassation applied this ruling in a case between Carrefour and Johnson & Johnson relating to the temporal applicability of Article 13 of the Damages Directive per which the burden of proving, in a passing-on defence, that an overcharge was passed on lies with the defendant (Cour de Cassation, 19 October 2022, no. 21-19.197). In this case, Carrefour had brought an action for damages against Johnson & Johnson, its supplier of hygiene products, on 23 January 2017, ie, after the expiry of the deadline for transposing the Damages Directive, but before the transposition into French Law.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Carrefour’s action as it failed to prove it did not benefit from the anti-competitive practices, prompting it to lodge an appeal on the ground that direct effect of EU law should have led the Court to apply Article 13 of the Damages Directive and therefore reverse the burden of proof, the transposition period having expired.
The Cour de Cassation reminded that based on CJEU case law, a directive cannot, by itself, create obligations for an individual and cannot therefore be invoked as such against them. The Cour de Cassation then applied the Volvo case, ie, it considered whether it could interpret national law, upon expiry of the time limit for transposing the Damages Directive not yet transposed, “so as to render the situation at stake immediately compatible with the provisions of that directive” without interpreting French law contra legem. The Cour de Cassation considered
“for acts committed prior to the entry into force of these provisions, pursuant to Articles 1382 and 1315 of the Civil Code, which have become Articles 1240 and 1353 of the Civil Code [...] that the burden of proving the existence of the damage caused by an anti-competitive practice lies with the claimant for compensation and that the claimant must, in light of the usual business practices, establish that it did not pass on the additional costs arising from a cartel to its own customers [...]” (Section 11).
The Cour de Cassation therefore considered that “After having established that the facts giving rise to the liability action brought by the Carrefour companies predated the entry into force of Article L. 481-4 of the Commercial Code and after having ruled that the provisions of Article 13 of the Directive were incompatible with the national law in force on the date of its transposition, the Court of Appeal rightly inferred that it could not interpret the rules of evidence applicable to the action referred to it in light of the latter text [...]” (Section 12).
While this decision clarifies the issue on the temporal applicability for the passing-on defence, it is not exempt of criticism. One might argue that Article 13 should not have been considered as a substantive provision but rather a procedural one. In fact, in the Volvo case, the CJEU underlined that “it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the rules on the burden of proof and the standard of proof are, in principle, classified as procedural rules”.
Liability of Parent Companies for their Subsidiaries’ Practices
A recent decision handed down by the Cour de Cassation (Cour de Cassation, 7 June 2023, no. 22-10.545) in the scope of the so-called dairy products cartel (French Competition Authority, no. 15-D-03, 11 March 2015) has enshrined vicarious liability in a private enforcement case: the Court relied on the European case law relating to the requirement lying with the parent company to bear the burden of its subsidiary’s condemnation over which it exercises decisive influence which had been applied in the public enforcement field and ruled that it ought to be extended to actions for damages.
The Court specified that such presumption could be rebutted if the parent company provides “any evidence relating to the organisational, economic and legal links between itself and its subsidiary such as to show that the latter acted autonomously on the market and that they do not form a single economic entity” (Section 7).